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The Supreme Court has recently rewritten another area of law:
extraterritorial application of United States federal statutes. Last term,
Morrison v. National Australia Bank jettisoned decades of settled law,
casting doubt on long-accepted practices of statutory construction and
instructing the lower courts to turn a deaf ear to indications of congressional
intent any subtler than the proverbial meat axe.' The straightforward
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1. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-78 (2010). As recently as Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550
U.S. 437, 456 (2007), the traditional analysis tracing its roots to American Banana Co. v. United
Fruits Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909), was still intact. Exactly how far back it can be traced is a
matter of some disagreement. The earliest case in the series was probably American Banana, but
the methodology has changed since that case, which focused almost exclusively on strict
territorialism. See American Banana, 213 U.S. at 358. Morrison recognized that Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S 690, 704-05 (1962), overruled American Banana.
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887 n. II ("These are no longer of relevance to the point (if they ever
were), since Continental Ore overruled the holding of [American Banana], that antitrust laws do
not apply to extraterritoriality."). The "effects test" for antitrust-which also influences the
development of the current extraterritoriality law for securities regulation-is ordinarily traced to
United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1953). Other early cases in
the development of modern extraterritoriality law include: Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571, 578
(1953) (dealing with application of U.S. law to a maritime tort that took place outside U.S.
territory); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949) (dealing with the application of the
Eight Hour Law to a contract between the United States and a private contractor for construction
work in a foreign country); Steele v. Bulova, 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952) (dealing with
extraterritorial application of U.S. trademark law); Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959) (dealing with application of U.S. law to maritime claims for injury
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presumption that American law ordinarily does not apply outside the
territory of the United States has now morphed into an innovative two-step
process that first marginalizes Congress and then showcases judicial
creativity.
Judging by the number of contributors to this Symposium who discuss
the case, Morrison's importance is generally appreciated.3 But two issues
raised by Morrison remain to be addressed. The first is the majority
opinion's pretensions to judicial modesty; its reworking of the presumption
against extraterritorial application of American federal statutes is peddled as
an antidote to federal judges run amok.4 Nothing could be further from the
truth; sober examination in the cold light of day reveals that Morrison's
new approach provides considerably greater opportunity for creative
judging than the method it replaces.5 The second is the potential damage
Morrison's new approach does to the definition of extraterritoriality,
generally. 6  The concept of "extraterritoriality" is important in areas as
diverse as the constitutionality of administrative regulation under the
Commerce Clause, Due Process limits on interstate and international
taxation,' and the applicability of the U.S. Constitution to international
crimes.9 Morrison requires rethinking of all of these.
This article starts with a brief introduction to Morrison, followed by
some critical remarks.'0 In most cases, raising the evidentiary standard for
rebutting the presumption has the perverse effect of abandoning evidence
that actually does bear-however imperfectly--on intended territorial
suffered onboard a foreign vessel outside U.S. territory); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20 (1963) (dealing with application of the National Labor
Relations Act to a foreign crew employed on vessels flying foreign flags and owned by foreign
subsidiaries of a U.S. company sailing between the United States and other countries). More
recent cases include: E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991) (dealing
with extraterritorial application of Title V1l of the Civil Rights Act); Hartford Fire Insurance Co.
v. Cahfornia, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (dealing with application of The Sherman Act and The
McCarran-Ferguson Act to foreign conduct meant to produce, and did in fact produce, some
substantial effect in the United States). None of these cases applied to two-step process set out in
Morrison. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 & n.9.
2. See infra Part l(B)(3) and note 57 and accompanying text.
3. See William S. Dodge, Morrison's Effects Test, 40 Sw. L. REv. 687 (2011); John H.
Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 40 SW. L. REv. 635 (2011).
4. See infra Part 1(B)(3)-(4).
5. See id.
6. See infra notes 53-55.
7. See discussion infra Part 2(A).
8. See discussion infra Part 2(B).
9. See discussion infra Part 2(C).
10. See infra Part l.
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scope." In place of a less-than-perfect evidentiary showing about
Congressional intentions, Morrison substitutes a purely judicial construct,
"focus," that makes no pretense at all of reflecting what Congress wanted. 12
So much for legislative supremacy.
The second half of the paper shows how this purely judicial construct
threatens to undermine cases in related areas that depend on existing
definitions of extraterritoriality." The Morrison majority's new definition
may cause problems in the precise context in which it was developed. But,
even more likely, it may not perform as intended in some of the other
settings to which Morrison might apply. 14 If Justice Scalia's approach to
extraterritoriality is found to be generally applicable, it will have
consequences that might surprise the Justices who voted for it.' 5
1. MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK: Two BITES AT THE APPLE
Morrison v. National Australia Bank involved the efforts of a foreign
investor to procure for the members of a foreign investors' class the
benefits of U.S. securities law.16 Although the defendants included both
foreigners and Americans, the securities in question were traded only on
foreign exchanges.17 Various aspects of the allegedly fraudulent conduct
occurred in the United States, but the purchase and sale of the securities at
issue had not.1" In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, and joined by
Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, the Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's dismissal.1 9  Justice Breyer concurred in part and
concurred in the judgment; 20 Justices Stevens filed a separate concurring
opinion in which Justice Ginsburg joined. 2' The opinion of interest to us
here is the majority's.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
13. See infra Part 2.
14. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
15. See infra text accompanying note 101.
16. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876 (2010).
17. Id at 2875-76.
18. Id.
19. Id at 2875, 2888.
20. Id at 2888 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
21. Id (Stevens, J., concurring).
2011] 657
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A. The Morrison Opinion
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court cuts back substantially on the
extent to which the familiar presumption against extraterritoriality allows
U.S. law to be applied to cases having contacts with foreign countries. It
explains this cutback in terms of respect for the authority of Congress and
the limited role of federal judges in our democratic system of government.22
At the same time, however, it mitigates the stringency of this new standard
by holding that certain cases with foreign elements do not actually involve
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 23 Where a particular contact-the
so-called "focus"-towards the United States, the case does not involve
extraterritoriality and the presumption is inapplicable. 24
The end result is that there are now two ways of arguing for the
applicability of U.S. law.25 Either one can claim that Congress intended
application of U.S. law to a particular set of facts or one can claim that the
particular fact pattern is not extraterritorial in the first place so that the
presumption is inapplicable.26  United States law applies if either the
presumption is relevant but rebutted, or the presumption is irrelevant. After
a brief elaboration of how the justices in the Morrison majority saw their
new logic functioning, we will turn to the question of whether they were
right.
1. The First Step: Deference to Congress
Morrison addresses application to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act of
the long-standing presumption that U.S. law is ordinarily not applicable
extraterritorially.2 7 Justice Scalia's opinion asks first whether Congress
provided any guidance sufficient to rebut the presumption. Its opening
lines are unremarkable:
It is a "long-standing principle of American law 'that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within
22. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 38-39.
24. See id.
25. See discussion infra p. 663 ("[Tlhe proponent of American law now gets 'two bites at the
apple .... ."').
26. See id.
27. Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (citing the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)).
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the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' . . . This principle
represents a canon of construction, or a presumption about the statute's
meaning, rather than a limit upon Congress's power to legislate .. . It rests
on the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to
domestic, not foreign matters.... Thus, "unless there is the affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed" to give the statute
extraterritorial effect, "we must presume it is primarily concerned with
domestic conditions." . . . The canon or presumption applies regardless of
whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a
foreign law ... When a statute ives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.
The opinion's sprinkling of citations to previous decisions suggests that
its drafters believed this way of framing the issue to be consistent with
previous judicial applications of the presumption.
Justice Scalia's opinion moves almost immediately beyond earlier
authority, however, explaining that the presumption against
extraterritoriality can only be rebutted by providing affirmative evidence of
what Congress actually intended. Judicial policy making, the Court made
clear, cannot be defended as an effort to determine what Congress would
have thought had the question of international applicability been raised.30
The opinion castigates the lower courts for misinterpreting the presumption,
singling out the Second Circuit for particular criticism, but also "[o]ther
Circuits [which]. . . described their decisions regarding the extraterritorial
application of [section] 10(b) as essentially resolving matters of policy."31
28. Id. at 2877-78 (internal citations omitted).
29. Id. at 2880-81.
Commentators have criticized the unpredictable and inconsistent application of § 10(b) to
transnational cases. . . . Others, more fundamentally, have noted that using congressional
silence as a justification for judge-made rules violates the traditional principle that silence
means no extraterritorial application. . . . The criticisms seem to us justified. The results of
judicial-speculation-made-law-divining what Congress would have wanted if it had thought
of the situation before the court-demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Rather than guess anew in each case, we apply the presumption in all
cases, preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable
effects.
Id (internal citations omitted).
30. See, e.g., id. at 2880 (criticizing "[o]ther Circuits [which] ... described their decisions
regarding the extraterritorial application of [section] 10(b) as essentially resolving matters of
policy"); see also id. at 2881 ("The results of judicial-speculation-made-law-divining what
Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court-demonstrate the
wisdom of the presumption against extraterritoriality.").
31. See, e.g., id. at 2878.
Despite this principle of interpretation, long and often recited in our opinions, the Second
Circuit believed that, because the Exchange Act is silent as to the extraterritorial application
of [section] 10(b), it was left to the court to "discern" whether Congress would have wanted
the statute to apply. . . . This disregard of the presumption against extraterritoriality did not
originate with the Court of Appeals panel in this case. It has been repeated over many
2011] 659
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The majority denies that its own standard is overly demanding. Justice
Scalia rejects, in particular, the concurring opinion's characterization of his
approach as a "clear statement" rule. He writes that under his new theory,
context as well as textual evidence can be taken into account:
[W]e do not say, as the concurrence seems to think, that the presumption
against extraterritoriality is a "clear statement rule," if by that is meant a
requirement that a statute say "this law applies abroad." Assuredly
context can be consulted as well. But whatever sources of statutory
meaning one consults to give "the most faithful reading" of the text ...
there is no clear indication of extraterritoriality here. 32
The majority's assurances that Morrison is not a "clear statement rule" are
not entirely convincing, considering the number of times the majority
opinion refers to clarity of the evidence as a necessary condition."
Even taking both text and context into account, Morrison could not
meet the requirement that proponents of U.S. law supply "affirmative
evidence" of congressional intent. "In short," the Court concluded, "there is
no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that [section] 10 (b) applies
extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not."34 It is only a
slight exaggeration to say that after Morrison nothing but a statutory choice
of law provision will be enough to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
Yet all is not lost for proponents of U.S. law; the opinion immediately
recognizes a second line of attack. Morrison rests, ultimately, on a
standardless concept-"focus"-that sneaks judicial values in through the
back door after slamming it closed at the front.
decades by various courts of appeals .. . . That has produced a collection of tests for defining
what Congress would have wanted, complex in formulation and unpredictable in application.
Id See also id. at 2878-79 ("[TJhe Second Circuit had excised the presumption against
extraterritoriality from the jurisprudence of [section] 10(b) and replaced it with the inquiry
whether it would be reasonable (and hence what Congress would have wanted) to apply the statute
to a given situation."); id. at 2879 ("[The effects test] became the north star of the Second
Circuit's [section] 10(b) jurisprudence, pointing the way to what Congress would have wished....
The Second Circuit never put forward a textual or even extra-textual basis for these tests.").
32. Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010) (internal citations
omitted).
33. See, e.g., id at 2877 (referring to "the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed"); id. at 2878 ("When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none."); id. at 2883 ("[W]hatever sources of statutory meaning one consults to
give 'the most faithful reading' of the text . . . there is no clear indication of extraterritoriality
here.").
34. Id at 2883.
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2. The Second Step: Focus
The second step involves a determination of whether the presumption
against extraterritoriality is even applicable. 3 5  The presumption, the
opinion argues, only applies to extraterritorial cases, and not to domestic
ones.36 Determining whether the dispute before the Court is extraterritorial
or domestic, reasons Justice Scalia, requires identifying the "focus" of the
substantive law in question.
The "focus" that the majority refers to is a relative newcomer to the
jurisprudence of extraterritoriality.37 It seems to be some sort of center of
gravity-the essence of the cause of action-such that if the focus is
situated in the United States the fact pattern as a whole can be treated as
domestic.38  Just as a case that is entirely internal to U.S. territory-all of
the parties, all the alleged injury, all of the property, and all of the activities
point to the United States-does not call for application of the presumption,
35. See id. at 2883-84.
36. Id.
Petitioners argue that the conclusion that § 10(b) does not apply extraterritorially does not
resolve this case. They contend that they seek no more than domestic application anyway,
since Florida is where HomeSide and its senior executives engaged in the deceptive conduct
of manipulating HomeSide's financial models; their complaint also alleged that Race and
Hughes made misleading public statements there. This is less an answer to the presumption
against extraterritorial application than it is an assertion-a quite valid assertion-that that
presumption here (as often) is not self-evidently dispositive, but its application requires
further analysis. For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all
contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption against extraterritorial
application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some
domestic activity is involved in the case. The concurrence seems to imagine just such a timid
sentinel, but our cases are to the contrary.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
37. Justice Scalia cited two earlier cases for this "focus" analysis. See id. at 2884 ("In
Aramco, for example, the Title VII plaintiff had been hired in Houston, and was an American
citizen. ... The court concluded, however, that neither that territorial event nor that relationship
was the "focus" of congressional concern . . . but rather domestic employment." (internal citations
omitted)). However, the application here was very different. In Morrison, the "focus" concept
was elevated to being a sufficient basis for the application of U.S. law; the two earlier cases did
not do this. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991) ("This
conclusion is fortified by the other elements in the statute suggesting a purely domestic focus.").
38. When one looks at the evidence that the Morrison Court considered in deciding in which
factor to find the focus, one finds the same sort of discussion of the statute as is commonly found
in earlier cases deciding extraterritoriality the traditional way. The Court cites to cases dealing
with substantive issues concerning securities law, leading the Court to conclude, for example, that
"[t]hose purchase and sale transactions are the objects of the statutes solicitude. It is those
transactions that the statute seems to "regulate."' Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. Material of this
sort is common in past cases dealing with extraterritorial application of U.S. law. See, e.g.,
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795-96 (1993); id. at 813-18 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248-56; Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-56
(2007).
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neither does any other case that has its "focus" in the United States. It is
not that the location of the focus in the United States rebuts the
presumption; it simply makes the presumption irrelevant. 3 9 Determination
that the focus of the case is situated within the United States thus obviates
the need for a tedious and most probably fruitless search for suitable proof
of what Congress intended.
This argument has a certain intuitive appeal. It is undeniable that the
presumption against the application of U.S. law has no relevance for cases
without foreign elements, that is, purely domestic cases. In the ordinary
domestic antitrust or securities fraud case the presumption is never brought
to bear, and it is not clear (if it were brought to bear) how it could be
rebutted. Where would one look for specific, affirmative indications that
our securities or antitrust laws apply to cases arising in the United States?
Domestic legislation does not ordinarily specify that it applies to cases
within the United States; this is taken for granted. The application of this
presumption to purely domestic disputes just does not make much sense.
The presumption that U.S. law does ordinarily apply to cases with only
domestic elements and the presumption that U.S. law does not ordinarily
apply to cases with foreign elements are mirror images. Justice Scalia
therefore seems to be on firm ground when he points out the need to
distinguish which cases are which.4 0 Morrison takes the logic one step
further though, arguing that U.S. domestic law automatically extends to
some mixed cases that are neither wholly domestic nor wholly foreign.4'
According to Morrison, the reason is that some mixed cases are not really
extraterritorial.4 2 The cases that are not extraterritorial are the ones said to
have a U.S. "focus." 4 3  For example, after surveying all the evidence,
Justice Scalia concluded that the focus of a securities dispute was the
transaction between the parties, so that if the transaction took place in the
United States the presumption would not apply:
[W]e think that the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where
the deception or originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in
the United States. . . .Those purchase-and-sale transactions are the objects
of the statute's solicitude. It is those transactions that the statute seeks to
"regulate" . . . it is parties or prospective parties to those transactions that
the statute seeks to "protec[t]". . . . And it is in our view only transactions
in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions and
39. See supra notes 35-36.
40. See Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883-84 (2010).
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other securities, to which [section] 10(b) applies.44
The Court identified the focus as including all purchases or sales taking
place in the United States, or a security listed on a domestic stock
exchange.4 5 Since on the facts of Morrison the transaction did not take
place in the United States, and the stocks were not listed in an exchange in
the United States, the case could not be treated as a domestic case; it was
extraterritorial, and the presumption against extraterritoriality would still
apply to bar the application of American securities law.4 If the transaction
had taken place in the United States, however, or the stocks had been listed
on an American stock exchange, the case would have to be treated as if it
were purely domestic and would escape the presumption against application
of American law.
The end result of Morrison's two-step reasoning is that the proponent
of American law now gets "two bites at the apple," or two different ways to
show that U.S. law applies. The plaintiff can either try to show that
Congress wanted its law to apply, or else argue that the case is sufficiently
domestic, so that no congressional mandate need be shown to justify the
statute's application. United States law applies, in other words, if either (1)
the case is sufficiently tied to the United States (because the focus occurred
there) so that Congress does not need to specify that U.S. law applies, or (2)
Congress indicated sufficiently and unambiguously its preference that U.S.
law should apply so that it does not matter that the focus is located
somewhere else.
B. Assessment
The possibility that the presumption against extraterritorial application
of a statute can be circumvented simply by declaring the presumption
inapplicable creates a major loophole. Rather than undertaking a thankless
(and probably fruitless) search for indications about what Congress wanted,
a court need only decide that the presumption against extraterritoriality is
inapplicable because the "focus" of the substantive law in question is
something that took place in the United States. The irony is that the
44. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
45. See, e.g., id. at 2886 ("The transactional test we have adopted [is] whether the purchase
or sale is made in the United States, or involves a security listed on a domestic exchange . . . .").
46. Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) ("Section 10(b)
reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of
any other security in the United States.").
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evidentiary standard needed to invoke the loophole-which no one pretends
has been authorized by Congress-is considerably lower than the
evidentiary standard needed to satisfy the presumption-a presumption that
supposedly reflects what Congress wanted. Morrison makes it more
difficult than before to base the result on what Congress wanted and easier
than before to base the decision on undeniably judge-made concepts.
On closer scrutiny of these considerations it appears that, while citing
the principle of legislative supremacy, Justice Scalia's opinion has actually
increased the opportunity for judicial policy making and diminished the
importance of congressional preferences. Given the novelty of the
approach it is not surprising how many questions remain unanswered.
Among the open questions are: whether this second step is really necessary;
the relative priority of the two steps; the role of judicial creativity; and the
potential for inconsistencies with what Congress expected or wanted.
1. Are Two Steps Really Necessary?
A preliminary question is whether this new apparatus is really
necessary. It seems doubtful. The traditional one-step approach
accommodated the same result without a second step, without a new
concept, and without self-congratulatory pronouncements about deference
to the elected branches.47
Pasquantino v. United States is such an example.48 Decided only five
years earlier, Pasquantino held a federal wire fraud statute applicable to a
scheme to defraud Canada of tax revenues that was undertaken in the
United States. 4 9 The presumption against extraterritoriality was held to be
satisfied because "[i]n any event, the wire fraud statute punishes frauds
executed 'in interstate or foreign commerce' . . . so this is surely not a
statute in which Congress had only 'domestic concerns in mind."' 50 Justice
Thomas wrote for the majority:
[O]ur interpretation of the wire-tap statute does not give it "extraterritorial
effect." . . . Petitioners used U.S. interstate wires to execute a scheme to
defraud a foreign sovereign of tax revenue. Their offense was complete
the moment they executed the scheme inside the United States; "[t]he wire
fraud statute punishes the scheme, not its success." . . . This domestic
element of petitioners' conduct is what the Government is punishing in
47. See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371-72 (2005).
48. Id
49. Id
50. Id (internal citation omitted).
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this prosecution, no less than when it prosecutes a scheme to defraud a
foreign individual or corporation, or a foreign government acting as a
market participant.
What is interesting about Pasquantino, for present purposes, is the
majority's reasoning about "what the Government is punishing": it was the
petitioners' (domestic) planning and preparation, the Court concluded,
which was sufficient under U.S. law to establish the offense.52 Pasquantino
did not employ the terminology of "focus" and did not create a major
loophole in the presumption; it simply interpreted the statute using common
sense.
Five years later, Morrison modified the terminology and reasoning
without improving in any way on the analysis. Writing that the central
"focus" of the regulatory scheme was the purchase and sale, the majority
opined that "[t]hose purchase-and-sale transactions are the objects of the
statute's solicitude. It is those transactions that the statute seeks to
'regulate."' 54 It then concluded that if the purchase and sale took place in
the United States, the case was a domestic case and application of U.S. law
would not be extraterritorial.ss
The common thread is that certain contacts-one or perhaps two-are
distinctive as somehow being the special object of the statute. The
difference is that, in the traditional setting, this line of reasoning is part of
the attempt to interpret the statute, and is therefore integral to the
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality. By the time it
reappears in Morrison, the concept is detached from application of the
presumption and not part of an effort to determine what Congress intended.
The Morrison court provides no reason to suggest why this change in
terminology, which moves the process further away from statutory
interpretation, is somehow necessary.
Most importantly, Pasquantino's conclusion is obviously subject to
congressional correction while Morrison's is less clear. Yet if the answer is
that Morrison's conclusion about "focus" is also subject to congressional
correction, then how is it different from (let alone better than) simply
treating every part of the analysis as statutory interpretation, as Pasquantino
does? The utility of a two-step process is far from clear.
51. Id. at 371 (emphasis added) (second alteration in original).
52. See id.
53. Morrison v. Nat'1 Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883-84 (2010).
54. Id (emphasis added).
55. Id at 2884-85.
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2. The Relative Priority of the Two Steps
The next reason for skepticism about Morrison's new approach relates
to the priority of the two steps. Initially, it is not clear why the majority
opinion sets the two steps out in the order that it does. The opinion asks
first about the existence of any congressional guidance rebutting the
presumption against extraterritorial application, and only then asks to which
cases the presumption applies.56  One might think that the line between
extraterritorial and domestic cases should be drawn first, thus identifying
the scope of the presumption, and the presumption applied to the
extraterritorial cases afterwards. Logically, the second step is really in the
nature of a threshold question, a precondition for the relevance of the first.
It is arguable that the order is not important; the result would be the
same either way. The opinion as a whole sets out two different paths to the
application of U.S. law, either one of which is adequate. United States law
will be applied if either the focus occurred in the United States or Congress
otherwise made some deliberate provision for application of U.S. law.
Which alternative is considered first does not affect the conclusion. This
argument has some truth to it. However, the order in which the questions
are asked does influence which prong a decision is likely to rest on. In any
case, with a fact pattern satisfying both prongs, the first question asked will
dispose of the case. By placing the presumption against extraterritoriality
first, the opinion increases the likelihood that the decision will be based on
that part of the analysis.
Does this matter? Logically, no; but, from a more political perspective,
possibly yes. The first step of the majority's analysis is clearly and self-
consciously grounded on deference to the elected branches.5 7  The
consistent theme throughout this section of the majority opinion is that
judges are not authorized to think creatively about what Congress would
have, should have, or could have, wanted.58 By placing the presumption
first in line, the Morrison Court gives greater visibility to the decision's
overtly ideological commitment. Future courts will have to address the first
question, congressional intent, as a precursor to the second. Even if the first
step of the analysis is not dispositive, rehearsing its merits in case after case
effectively reinforces the Court's position. The Court's way of ordering the
analysis thus increases the visibility and apparent importance of the
56. Id at 2884 n.9 ("Although it is true, as we have said, that [section] 10(b) has no
extraterritorial effect does not resolve this case, it is a necessary first step in the analysis."
(emphasis added)).
57. See id. at 2877-78, 2881.
58. See id. at 2881.
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decision's chief ideological component: legislative supremacy.
3. Morrison and Judicial Creativity
The impression thus created, however-that congressional intent is the
most important concern-is quite misleading. Overall, the standard of
proof for rebutting the presumption against extraterritoriality is so
restrictive that it is almost impossible to base decision on that consideration.
Filling the vacuum is the new concept of "focus," which is a judicial
creation. The Court's professions of deference to Congress in the first step
of the analysis are simply a distraction from a more important, but less
obvious consideration: the judicial creativity involved in resolution of the
second step.
Morrison brings about this change in orientation by ruling out certain
indications of congressional intent that would otherwise be taken into
account. In the ordinary domestic context, as in the traditional approach
to extraterritoriality, interpretation of statutes takes at least three different
forms. The first includes explicit intent of Congress (express intent); the
second includes factual inference about what Congress actually wanted but
did not clearly state (implied in fact intent); and a third includes reasoning
about what Congress would probably have wanted under the circumstances,
considering all remaining available evidence about actual congressional
policies and priorities (constructive intent). While the first is more
probative than the second, and the second more probative than the third, in
domestic cases there is no categorical bar to using any of these. Neither,
until Morrison, was there a categorical bar in extraterritoriality disputes.60
Morrison, however, holds that application of U.S. law to international
cases must be shown to have been the affirmative and clear intent of
Congress.61 In cases with international elements, it categorically bars the
third type of argument and probably also rules out most or all of the second.
The evidence that Morrison eliminates from consideration might not be the
most probative evidence that one would like; it is, however, closer to
determination of congressional intent than the concept that replaces it. The
Morrison opinion seems to assume that it is better for judges to ignore
congressional preferences that are insufficiently articulated than to do their
best, on less than perfect evidence, to determine what Congress was
59. See Morrison v. Nat'1 Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2892 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
60. See id. at 2891-92.
61. Id. at 2877 (Scalia, J., majority).
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probably thinking.
Moreover, the gap created by disallowing inference about actual or
constructive intent is filled by adding in an analysis of the statute's "focus."
Focus is not determined by consulting affirmative intent of Congress;
tellingly, the sort of protestations about a single-minded search for actual
congressional intentions that characterized Morrison's first step are
nowhere in evidence. 62 The evidence that the majority opinion consults
resembles more nearly the proof of "constructive intent" that the Court
63
specifically ruled out for purposes of rebutting the presumption.
Therefore, once the analysis moves into this second step-which (since the
presumption will rarely be rebutted) it typically will-a decision to apply
U.S. law cannot be attributed to the will of the elected branches.
The way that the standard is presented obscures the degree to which the
effect of Morrison's rule is to impose a higher standard on Congress.
Morrison is, in effect, a judicially imposed requirement that Congress
express itself more clearly in international applications of a statute than is
required in domestic applications, on pain of having its wishes ignored.
Morrison's two-step approach is the logical equivalent of a rule stating that
where the focus of the dispute is not in the United States-as determined in
accordance with a judicially crafted standard-then for U.S. law to apply
Congress must indicate its wishes clearly. To dislodge the judicially crafted
standard, in other words, a clear affirmation of congressional intent must be
shown. The presumption that results is not so much a presumption against
extraterritoriality, but rather a presumption in favor of the judicially crafted
definition of focus. Whatever this is, it is not judicial deference.
Justice Scalia's insistence that extraterritoriality must be supported by
unambiguous evidence of Congressional intent is a convenient rhetorical
64 rdcalplatform for delivering an ideological message. But the predictable
consequence is that this standard will not be met and the best available
evidence will have to be disregarded. The Morrison majority told the lower
courts, in effect, that if Congress doesn't "affirmatively" spell things out,
then they have no authority to try to figure out what Congress wanted.65
The unintended consequence of the Court's insistence on the highest
standards of proof at the first stage is likely to be the increased importance
of judicial creativity in the second. Closet judicial activists now have the
best of both worlds: grand protestations of deference to the elected branches
together with virtually total flexibility to decide the case as they see fit.
62. See id. at 2883-86.
63. See id. at 2879-81.
64. See id at 2892 (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. Morrison v. Nat'i Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010) (Scalia, J., majority).
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4. Contradicting Congress
The lack of deference to Congress is not a purely theoretical problem;
in certain cases, the Morrison approach may actually result in contradicting
the result that Congress wanted. A key problem with Morrison's two-step
approach is that the first-step analysis of congressional intent, which the
Court recognizes as the authoritative policy of the elected branches of
government, is not the end of the matter. If the Morrison majority is
assumed to be correct arguendo-namely, if one assumes that its grudging
refusal to consider ambiguous evidence is an accurate way to determine
what Congress wanted-then why isn't that conclusion dispositive?
Adding another step to the calculation-a step that has no basis in
legislative preference-can only dilute the legitimacy of the Court's
conclusion.
Of course, if the presumption is rebutted at the first step, and U.S. law
held applicable, then that is dispositive and the legitimacy of the ultimate
conclusion is not in doubt. But if the presumption is not rebutted, as will
usually be the case, then the proponent of U.S. law has another chance. He
or she can try to establish enough connection with the U.S. that the "focus"
of the dispute is local, the case is domestic, and U.S. law applies even
though no evidence has been offered that this is what Congress wanted.
What makes this result problematic is that the decision at the first step
not to apply U.S. law ought to create something of a negative inference.
This is particularly clear (although not in theory limited to) the case where
the statute includes a choice of law provision. If the choice of law
provision is not satisfied, the substantive law in question seemingly should
not apply. 6 Assume, for example, that there is sufficient evidence to
satisfy the Court that Congress affirmatively and explicitly concluded that
the securities act should be applicable whenever the defendant is an
American national. Assume, also, that (as per Morrison) the "focus" of the
securities law is determined to be the location of the transaction.
If a case arises in which the defendant is foreign but the transaction
occurred in the United States, then the first step does not support
application of U.S. law, but the second step does. Under Morrison, U.S.
66. Does a plot to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violate the federal fraud
statute? According to the Court, "[bjecause the plain terms of [section] 1343 criminalize such a
scheme, and because this construction of the wire fraud statute does not derogate from the
common-law revenue rule ... it does." Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 353 (2005)
(reaching this holding despite the dissent's argument about the presumption against
extraterritoriality).
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67law applies even though the choice of law provision suggests the contrary.
But this cannot be the right result. Where Congress' intention is clear (e.g.,
because there is a choice of law provision in the statute), the statute should
apply only if the defendant is American. Surely it is not open to a federal
judge to decide that despite the failure to satisfy an explicit choice of law
provision there is, nonetheless, an implicit alternate basis for application of
U.S. law.
5. Conclusion: The Best as Enemy of the Good?
Where there is an inadequate volume of ambiguous evidence about
Congress' intentions, there are two possible responses. The judge can still
make his or her best efforts to construe the statute in the face of uncertainty.
In the alternative, the judge can disregard whatever particularized evidence
does exist and apply a presumption. Morrison changes this calculation
about what to do when the evidence is minimal. Because the standard for
legislative clarity is raised, the probability that the case will be decided on
particularized evidence is reduced. Fewer cases by far will be decided
according to the usual methods of statutory construction-making the best
decision possible of whatever evidence can be found-while more cases
will be decided by applying the presumption than under the traditional
view. But Morrison adds a third possible outcome to the mix: U.S. law can
be applied in cases where something that happened in the United States is
the focus of the dispute.
Of the three alternatives-decide on the basis of whatever minimal
evidence can be found, decide on the basis of a generalized presumption but
no specific evidence, and decide on the basis of whether the United States is
the "focus" of the dispute-the Morrison solution is the worst, from the
point of view of respect for Congress. Basing application of U.S. law on
the judicially created concept of "focus"-established using evidence that
would not qualify to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality-can
hardly be explained or defended as respect for the policies and preferences
of the elected branches of government in a democracy.
67. Because the defendant was not an American-and because the nationality of the
defendant was singled out by Congress-the presumption against extraterritoriality is still
applicable. Although the presumption has been rebutted for certain situations (those where the
defendant is American), it still applies in all cases where the defendant is of foreign nationality.
As the Morrison Court put it, "[W]hen a statute provides for some extraterritorial application, the
presumption against extraterritoriality operates to limit that provision to its terms." Morrison, 130
S. Ct. at 2883.
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2. MORRISON AND RELATED APPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The changes that Morrison might potentially bring about are not
limited to its original context, namely, the international reach of federal
statutory law. Extraterritoriality plays a role in other areas of law, as well.68
Sometimes the importance of the concept turns on idiosyncratic and fact-
specific applications of particular federal statutes, such as the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, the National Labor Relations Act, or the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 69 But there are also several well-defined areas in
68. In addition to the contexts discussed in this article, extraterritoriality has been cited as a
relevant consideration in other contexts. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975)
(the right to travel); Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1980) (Full Faith and
Credit Clause); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) (Due Process Clause's
limitations on state choice-of-law); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (federal
limits on state choice-of-law questions); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,
377 (2000) (foreign relations law); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694,
707 (1988) (service of process); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 U.S.
1431, 1440 (2010) (class action suits).
69. The Court considered whether the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act preempted Iowa tax
law in Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Department of Revenue. 488 U.S. 19, 32 (1988) ("For the reasons set
out above . . . [w]e hold that the OCSLA prevents any state, adjacent or inland, from asserting
extraterritorial taxing jurisdiction over OCS lands but that the inclusion of income derived from
the OCS in the unitary tax base of a constitutionally permissible apportionment formula does not
amount to extraterritorial taxation by the taxing state."). The Court considered the McCarran-
Ferguson Act in Federal Trade Commission v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960). The
Nebraska statute provided, "No person shall engage in this state in unfair methods of competition
or in unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of the business of insurance. No person
domiciled in or resident of this state shall engage in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or
deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of the business of insurance in any other state territory,
possession, province, country, or district." Id. at 295-96. The Court was "asked to hold that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act operate[d] to oust the Commission of jurisdiction by reason of
[Nebraska's] attempted regulation of its domiciliary's extraterritorial activities." Id. at 297-
98. "[T]he impediments, contingencies, and doubts which constitutional limitations might create
as to Nebraska's power to regulate any given aspect of extraterritorial activity serve only to
confirm the reading" the Court gave to the Act, which did not favor Nebraska. Id. at 302. In Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers, International Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., the Court had
to decide "whether under [section] 14(b) [of the National Labor Relations Board Act], Texas'
right-to-work laws [could] void an agency-shop agreement covering unlicensed seamen who,
while hired in Texas and having a number of other contacts with the State, spen[t] the vast
majority of their working hours on the high seas." 426 U.S. 407, 409-10 (1976). "[T]he union
[did] not claim that Texas' contacts [were] so minimal as to make the application of the Texas
laws in any way unconstitutional. Nor [did] respondent argue that Congress lacked the power, if it
wished, to prohibit state right-to-work laws altogether." Id. at 413 n.6. The question was
"whether Texas' contacts with this employment relationship [were] adequate to call into play
[section] 14 (b)'s mandated deference to State law." Id. at 417. "[B]ecause most of the
employees' work [was] done on the high seas, outside the territorial bounds of the State of Texas,
Texas' right-to-work laws [could not] govern the validity of the agency-shop provision at issue
here" Id. at 420. The Court found that because "[flederal policy favors permitting such
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which extraterritoriality plays a sustained and central role.
Three areas that we will examine are: Due Process Clause and
Commerce Clause scrutiny of state regulatory authority; 70 Due Process and
Commerce Clause scrutiny of state power to tax;71 and the extraterritorial
application of the Bill of Rights and other federal protections for the
individual.72 The first two of these examples involve restrictions on the
activities of the individual states of the United States ("states" in the
domestic context). In both of these areas, Morrison creates an additional
opportunity for states to argue that the exercise of power is constitutionally
permissible because it is actually domestic and not extraterritorial.73
The last of the three-the scope of the federal protections for the
individual-is more complex. Reclassifying certain problems as domestic
rather than extraterritorial provides an added opportunity for arguing that
federal norms extend to the situation under consideration. As in some other
contexts, Morrison, therefore, results in a potential expansion of federal
authority. But since expanding the scope of federal provisions for
protection of the individual means expanding judicial scrutiny of the actions
of the federal elected branches, applying Morrison to norms such as these
has the indirect consequence of restricting the power of Congress and the
Executive.
In all three of these areas, the question arises whether the Morrison's
logic should be applied generally in all contexts where that logic seems to
apply, or whether it should be restricted to its original domain. This
question is substantial and challenging enough to be left for another day.
agreements unless a State or Territory with a sufficient interest in the relationship expresses a
contrary policy via right-to-work laws," it remained "fully consistent with national labor policy"
in concluding that "[when] the predominant jobsite is outside the boundary of any State ... no
State has a sufficient interest in the employment relationship and ... no State's right-to-work laws
can apply." Id. at 420-21. In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, two Kentucky
residents claimed that "Kentucky's differential taxation of municipal bond income impermissibly
discriminate[d] against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause." 553 U.S. 328,
336 (2008). The Court, "[u]nder the resulting protocol for dormant commerce clause analysis,"
asked "whether [the] challenged law discriminate[d] against interstate commerce." Id. at
338. The Court reasoned that "[a] discriminatory law is 'virtuallyper se invalid' . . . and will
survive only if it 'advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."' Id. The Court continued, "Absent discrimination for
the forbidden purpose, however, the law 'will be upheld unless the burden imposed on [interstate]
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."' Id. at 338-39 (alteration
in original) (citation omitted).
70. See infra Part 2(A).
71. See infra Part 2(B).
72. See discussion infra Part 2(C).
73. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
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A. Extraterritorial Regulation, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and Due
Process
One of the areas of law that has been significantly influenced by the
concept of extraterritoriality is state regulation of interstate activities under
the Due Process and dormant Commerce Clauses. There are several strands
of Commerce Clause analysis. One is that states are not supposed to
discriminate against interstate commerce; another (of uncertain status
today) is the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. balancing test, which asks whether
the state action in question places an undue burden on interstate
commerce. 7 4
The type of Commerce Clause limitation that is important here is
neither of these; it is the Commerce Clause prohibition on state regulation
of conduct that takes place entirely (or nearly so) within another state. In
this context, it works in tandem with the Due Process Clause, which plays a
similar role in restricting "extraterritorial" regulation. As the Court
explained in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, "Alabama may insist
that BMW adhere to a particular disclosure policy in that State," but it
"does not have the power to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful
where it occurred and that had no impact on Alabama or its residents."
Healy v. Beer Institute76 is a good example of how the Commerce
Clause is used to invalidate state regulatory extraterritoriality. Healy
addressed the impact of that clause on a Connecticut regulation adopted
under the state's Liquor Control Act.77 The regulation at issue required out-
74. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). In declining to join Part IV of the Court's opinion in Davis,
which dealt with whether the Pike balancing test applied in that case, Justice Scalia argued for
abandoning the Pike test altogether:
The Court declines to engage in Pike balancing here because courts are ill suited to
determining whether or not this law imposes burdens on interstate commerce that clearly
outweigh the law's local benefits, and the "balancing" should therefore be left to Congress . .
. . The problem is that courts are less well suited than Congress to perform this kind of
balancing in every case. The burdens and the benefits are always incommensurate, and
cannot be placed on the opposite balances of a scale without assigning a policy-based weight
to each of them. It is a matter not of weighing apples against apples, but of deciding whether
three apples are better than six tangerines. Here, on one end of the scale (the burden side)
there rests a certain degree of suppression of interstate competition in borrowing; and on the
other (the benefits side) a certain degree of facilitation of municipal borrowing. Of course
you cannot decide which interest "outweighs" the other without deciding which interest is
more important to you. And that will always be the case. I would abandon the Pike-
balancing enterprise altogether and leave these quintessentially legislative judgments with the
branch to which the Constitution assigns them.
Davis, 553 U.S. at 360 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas
further argued that the "negative commerce clause" should be discarded in its entirety as having
no basis in the Constitution. See id. at 361 (Thomas, J., concurring).
75. 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996).
76. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
77. See id. at 326.
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of-state beer distributors to affirm that their posted prices were, at the
moment of posting, no higher than the prices at which they were selling the
same products in the neighboring states. 8 The motivation underlying the
regulation was the desire that Connecticut's sellers be competitive with
liquor stores within a short driving distance.79 If Connecticut prices were
higher than those in nearby states, Connecticut residents would simply drive
across the state lines to buy.80
The Supreme Court held that the regulation, on its face, violated the
Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce.81  It
pointed out that the posting rule applied only to shippers engaged in
interstate commerce and not to those engaged solely in Connecticut sales.82
Of greater relevance here, however, is the majority's alternative basis for
decision. The distributors also argued that the Connecticut statute
"regulated out-of-state transactions ... in violation of the Commerce
Clause,"8 and the Supreme Court agreed. 84
The Court's opinion relied on an earlier Supreme Court case, Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v New York State Liquor Authority.8 5 Brown-
Forman invalidated a New York law that prohibited interstate distributors
from charging more in New York than for the same item in any other state
during the month that followed. 86 The Brown-Forman Court noted,
"[O]nce the distiller has posted prices in New York, it is not free to change
its prices elsewhere in the United States during the relevant month. Forcing
a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one state before undertaking a
transaction in another directly regulates interstate commerce."87 The
Brown-Forman Court explained why the Commerce Clause was relevant to
the constitutional validity of extraterritoriality in the following terms:
Taken together, our cases concerning the extraterritorial effects of state
economic regulation stand at a minimum for the following propositions:
First, the "Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of the state
statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders,
whether or not the commerce has effects within the state." . . . Second, a
statute that directly controls commerce of current wholly outside the
78. Id. at 326, 328-29.
79. See id. at 326-27.
80. Id at 326.
81. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 340 (1989).
82. Id. at 340-341.
83. Id. at 330.
84. Id. at 337, 340.
85. See id at 335-37 (relying on Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. 573 (1986)).
86. 476 U.S. at 575, 585.
87. Id. at 582 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
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boundaries of the state exceeds the current limits of the enacting state's
authority and his invalid regardless of whether the statutes extra territorial
reach was intended by the legislature. The critical inquiry is whether the
practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the
boundaries of the state. 88
Healy also cited another extraterritoriality decision, Edgar v. MTE
Corp., as "significantly illuminat[ing] the contours of the constitutional
prohibition on extraterritorial legislation." 90 In MITE Corp., a plurality of
the Court struck down the Illinois Business Takeover Act, which required
that a takeover offer for a target company having specified connections to
Illinois not become effective until 20 days after notifying Illinois's
Secretary of State. 91 During this time the offer was to be subject to
administrative evaluation. 9 2 The plurality in MTE Corp. noted that "[t]he
limits on a State's power to enact substantive legislation are similar to the
limits on the jurisdiction of state courts."93 In both contexts, "any attempt
'directly' to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property
would offend sister states and exceed the inherent limits of the State's
power."94 The plurality found the statute violated the Commerce Clause
because it "directly regulate[d] transactions which [took] place across state
lines, even if wholly outside the state of Illinois." 9 5  While a plurality
opinion itself, MTE Corp. has since been upheld in CTS Corp. v. General
Dynamics Corp. ofAmerica.96
Morrison is potentially relevant to this strand of Due Process and
Commerce Clause reasoning. If applied in this context, its logic might
require reversing some existing Commerce Clause and Due Process
decisions. Morrison's relevance stems from its reinterpretation of the
concept of extraterritoriality through the addition of a new concept: "focus."
Consider, for example, the fact pattern in Healy. In Healy, there were
contacts between the distributors and Connecticut and also between the
88. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (citing Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579,
581-83).
89. 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality opinion).
90. Healy, 491 U.S. at 333 n.9. Other cases falling under this category include: Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); S. Pac. Co. v. Ariz. ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945);
and Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
91. AITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 626-27, 646.
92. See id at 627.
93. Id. at 643.
94. Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)).
95. Id. at 641.
96. CTS Corp. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 80-81 (1987).
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distributors and other states. 97 The beer distributors were interstate in their
operation, delivering to both of the two. 9 8 It seems fairly plausible to argue
that the main "focus" of the Connecticut regulators "solicitude" (to use the
language of Morrison) was Connecticut; interest in prices in the state of
New York was at best secondary, a means to the end of encouraging
Connecticut sales.
If a court were to determine that the focus of the challenged statute was
in Connecticut, then (under the Morrison reasoning) the regulation that
provoked the constitutional challenge would not be extraterritorial, but
domestic. Since the Commerce Clause/Due Process challenge rested on the
extraterritoriality of Connecticut regulation, and since there is no
comparable constitutional basis for challenging a domestic regulation, it
seems that the opposite result should have been reached.99 The statute,
apparently, should have been upheld.
M7TE Corp. might have to be revisited, as well. In MITE Corp., there
were connections to Illinois as well as to other states. 00 It can be argued
that the Illinois regulatory structure was "focused" on the Illinois aspects of
the takeover. If this argument was successful then, under the second step of
Morrison, the entire dispute would be reclassified as domestic. Domestic
disputes can of course be regulated by domestic regulators.
Morrison itself gives no clues about whether its reasoning will be used
to reexamine Commerce Clause and Due Process challenges to
"extraterritorial" regulation. The logic of the opinion appears to call for this
extension; it redefines as a matter of straightforward common sense
reasoning the characterization of a problem as "extraterritorial." If taken
literally, this interpretation of how the concept of extraterritoriality should
be understood is equally applicable in the context of state regulatory
authority. Yet, applying Morrison in this literal fashion would upset
decades of precedent interpreting the Commerce and Due Process Clauses.
Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether it would be desirable to extend
Morrison to apply to such circumstances.101 It seems fair to assume that the
Morrison majority did not mean to take a position on this matter when it
wrote its opinion; the question, therefore, remains to be decided.
97. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326-27 & n.2 (1989).
98. Id.
99. This argument does not take into account the possibility of a challenge on other
Commerce Clause grounds; for example, the claim that the Connecticut regulation discriminated
against out-of-state distributors.
100. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641 (1982).
101. See discussion infra Part 2(B).
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B. Extraterritoriality and Taxation: The Commerce and Due Process
Clauses
Extraterritoriality has also long been a staple concept in the Due
Process and Commerce Clause review of inter-jurisdictional taxation, in
particular state taxation of corporations.1 0 2 State taxation is constitutionally
infirm when there is an inadequate connection between the state and the
taxpayer. 103 Thus, for example, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota invalidated on
Commerce Clause grounds a state effort to tax out-of-state mail order
businesses with no physical presence within the state.'0 Similarly, State
Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyard held that due process prohibits state
taxation of insurance contracts where the only connection between the state
and the contract is that the insured risk was located there. 05
The word extraterritoriality is not always used to describe the
problem; 106 more elaborate explanations of the role of the two clauses
sometimes explain the constitutional requirement as being a "link" or
"minimum connection" between the taxed activity and the taxing state.10 7
102. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Wisc. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20 (1980) ("The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes two requirements for such state
taxation: a 'minimal connection' or 'nexus' between the interstate activities in the taxing State,
and 'a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of
the enterprise"' (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436 (1980))). See
also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 268 (1978); Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of
State of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
103. See Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 219-20.
104. 504 U.S. 298, 301-02, 317-18 (1992).
105. 370 U.S. 451, 454-57 (1962). This decision could not rely on the Commerce Clause
because the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011-12, grants states unusual latitude for
regulating the business of insurance. See id. at 452.
106. See, e.g., Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 221 ("The company had the 'distinct burden of
showing by "clear and cogent evidence" that it results in extraterritorial values being taxed."'
(quoting Norfolk & W. R.R. Co. v. N.C. ex rel Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682, 688 (1936))); Trinova
Corp. v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 387 (1991) (Scalia, J. concurring) ("The only
issue, then, is whether the tax violates the Due Process Clause by taxing extraterritorial values.").
107. E.g., Meadwestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 24-25 (2008).
The Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause impose distinct but parallel limitations on
a State's power to tax out-of-state activities . . . The Due Process Clause demands that there
exist some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and person, property or
transaction it seeks to tax as well as a rational relationship between the tax and the values
connected with the taxing state. . . . The Commerce Clause forbids the states to levy taxes
that discriminate against interstate commerce or that burden it by subjecting activities to
multiple or unfairly apportioned taxation . . . The broad inquiry subsumed in both
constitutional requirements is whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal
relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state-that is, whether the state
has given anything for which it can ask return.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 210.
The first issue is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents the
State from applying its statutory apportionment formula to the total corporate income of the
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However, it is clear that extraterritoriality remains the central issue. The
opening sentence of the Court's most recent tax decision reads simply, "The
Due Process and Commerce Clauses forbid the States to tax extraterritorial
values."108
Today, cases are relatively infrequent in which the corporate taxpayer
has no contact at all with the taxing state; states are generally not so
unsophisticated as to tax an entity with no connection at all.' 09 The mere
fact that the taxpayer is subject to the tax jurisdiction of a particular state,
however, does not mean that it is subject to that state's taxation of one
hundred percent of its assets, wherever located."o Allowing a single state
to tax one hundred percent of the assets would be unfair both to the
taxpayer and to other states that wish to tax the same income or property.
An allocation must therefore be made through an apportionment formula
that effectively divides the assets among the different states in which the
taxpayer is present, owns property, or earns income."'
There is of course no single correct way to apportion assets. Many
states, predictably enough, devise their apportionment formula so as to
impose their levies on as large a share as possible of the taxpayer's
wealth.112  The taxpayer naturally enough plays a similar game of
"accounting hide and seek," framing its corporate structure and adjusting its
accounting methods so as to insulate its major assets from the power of
states with the highest tax rates. The most frequently litigated issue in
modern Supreme Court tax cases is therefore whether a state's
apportionment formula satisfies constitutional standards.
Allegations of extraterritoriality typically arise in situations where an
apportionment formula uses the value of assets in other states as one
consideration in calculating the amount the taxpayer owes. Such use of the
taxpayer when the taxpayer's functional accounting separates its income and the three
distinct categories of marketing, exploration and production, and refining, and when the
taxpayer performs only marketing operations within the State. The second issue is whether
the Due Process Clause permits the State to subject to taxation under its statutory
apportionment formula income derived from the extraction of oil and gas located outside the
State which is used by the refining department of the taxpayer, or whether the State is
required to allocate such income to the situs state. The third issue is whether the Commerce
Clause requires such an allocation to the situs State.
Id.
108. Meadwestvaco Corp., 553 U.S. at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. See, e.g., infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
110. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983).
111. See generally FREDINAND P. SCHOETTLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: THE LAW AND
POLICY OF MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL TAXATION, 713-54 (2003).
112. See, e.g., Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 183 (discussing the facts of Hans Rees'Sons, Inc.
v. N.C. ex rel Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931)).
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value of assets in other states is not per se unlawful; for example, there are
legitimate reasons that the taxing State might want to take into account the
overall size of the corporation.11 3  Most of the apportionment formulas
facing Due Process and Commerce Clause challenges have, accordingly,
been upheld. 14  For example, Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of
Revenue upheld a Wisconsin apportionment formula that took into account
not only marketing, but also exploration, production and refining."' It did
so even though the taxpayer performed only marketing operations within
the state.116 Similarly, in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. G.D. Bair, the
Court held that Iowa's single factor formula did not result in extraterritorial
taxation in violation of the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause." 7
Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Department of Treasury presented "the principal
question ... whether the three-factor apportionment formula of the
Michigan single business tax violates either the Due Process Clause or the
Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution.""' The apportionment
formula was upheld." 9
Morrison is potentially relevant in the tax context for the same reasons
as it was in the regulatory context. What potentially triggered the
application of Morrison in the regulatory context was the description as
"extraterritorial" of a state's attempts to regulate conduct that had important
connections with other states.120 Similarly, Morrison is potentially relevant
in tax cases where the taxpayer has property or income in states other than
the taxing state, because a tax scheme that takes into account the property or
income located elsewhere can be 'challenged as "extraterritorial." If this
113. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 440-41 (1980)
("Superficially, intercorporate division might appear to be a more attractive basis for limiting
apportionability. But the form of business organization may have nothing to do with the
underlying unity or diversity of business enterprise. Had appellant chosen to operate its foreign
subsidiaries as separate divisions of a legally as well as a functionally integrated enterprise, there
is little doubt that the income derived from those divisions would meet due process requirements
for apportionability.").
114. See also Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 32 (1988) ("[T]he
inclusion of income derived from the [Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act] in the unitary tax base
of a constitutionally permissible apportionment formula does not amount to extraterritorial
taxation by the taxing state."); Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 197 (1983) ("[W]e cannot conclude
that the California tax at issue here is preempted by federal law or fatally inconsistent with federal
policy.").
115. 447 U.S. 207,at212-14,218-19(1980).
116. Id. at 212-13 ("Appellant had no exploration and production operations over farming
operations in Wisconsin; the only act to be carried out in that State was marketing.").
117. 437 U.S. 267, 281 (1978).
118. 498 U.S. 358, 361 (1991).
119. Id. at 387.
120. See discussion supra Section 2(A).
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characterization is accepted, then the attempt to tax may be held
unconstitutional.
Morrison potentially changes this result by altering the contours of the
concept of extraterritoriality. If the taxing state is the "focus" of the
exercise of tax power, then, under the logic of Morrison, the dispute would
not be extraterritorial but domestic. In the Supreme Court cases mentioned
above, the taxing authorities all had substantial connections to the
taxpayer.121 It would be understandable if a court decided that the focus
state was the taxing authority. If so, it seems the cases should probably be
re-characterized as domestic; the extraterritoriality problem would then be
resolved.
The consequence of applying Morrison is that a case where taxation
might otherwise be invalidated for extraterritoriality becomes a case where
the law may be upheld. Morrison accomplishes this by turning
"extraterritorial" taxation or regulation into regulation or taxation of a
domestic occurrence. Morrison effectively increases the reach of state
authority. As was observed in the context of state regulatory authority,
however, it does not appear that the Morrison majority had in mind the
impact of their logic in other contexts, such as these.122 It therefore remains
to be seen whether this logical corollary of Morrison's redefinition of
extraterritoriality will have be given practical effect.
C. Extraterritoriality and the Protection ofIndividual Rights: The War on
Terror and the War on Drugs
A third category includes cases delimiting the territorial reach of U.S.
federal protections of individual rights, in particular constitutional
protections. This category includes a number of different constitutional
provisions: the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Suspension
Clause, and the Due Process Clause, among others.123 A related group of
cases involves the territorial applicability of international treaties and
conventions that protect the individual. 124 We will focus below on cases
121. See, e.g., supra notes 115-19.
122. See supra Part 2(A) for a discussion of extraterritoriality and state regulation.
123. See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 299 (2006) (dealing with "domestic
relations" and "probate" exceptions to federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy); Munaf v. Gerene, 553
U.S. 674, 679 (2008) (dealing with jurisdiction of U.S. Courts over habeas petition filed on behalf
of U.S. nationals suspected of crimes allegedly committed in Iraq); United States v. Louisiana,
394 U.S. 11, 16-17 (1969) (dealing with delimitation of internal waters and whether U.S. federal
law or international law should apply).
124. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 158 (1993) (dealing with
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concerning the protection of individuals in the context of the war on terror
and the war on drugs.
For reasons explained above, Morrison potentially alters the results in
such cases by extending the reach of a constitutional provision that might
otherwise not be applicable outside the United States. 12 5 It accomplishes
this reversal by supplying a second line of argument for validating
application of U.S. law to cases with foreign elements. The second line of
argument is that the case is in fact domestic, and not extraterritorial,
because the focus of the norm in question is on activities taking place
within the United States. 126 There are also situations in which Morrison
might alter the reasoning of the decision, without changing the result. And,
finally, there are cases in which Morrison would only confirm the decision
that has already been reached.
1. The War on Drugs and the Applicability of Criminal Procedural
Protections
United States v. Verdugo- Urquidez illustrates the potential application
of Morrison to the question of the extraterritoriality of the Constitution.12 7
The reasoning in Verdugo-Urquidez is already similar enough to
Morrison's that only relatively minor adjustments would have to be made.
Verdugo-Urquidez is therefore a good example of the intuitive appeal of the
Morrison logic in the constitutional context.
The defendant, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was alleged to be a
leader of a violent criminal organization in Mexico responsible for
smuggling large volumes of narcotics into the United States."' 2 8 Acting in
cooperation with American law enforcement, the Mexican police seized
him and handed him over to U.S. officials at the United States-Mexico
border.12 9  Within hours, they searched his two houses in Mexico; no
warrant had been obtained. 3 0  Facing trial in the United States, the
defendant argued for the exclusion of the seized evidence on the basis of the
Fourth Amendment.' 3' The Supreme Court found that the Fourth
whether the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Refugee Convention apply to forced
repatriation to Haiti of Haitians intercepted on the high seas).
125. See supra Part I (A)(2).
126. Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
127. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
128. Id. at 262.
129. Id
130. Id. at 262-63.
131. See id. at 263.
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Amendment exclusionary rule did not prohibit admission of the fruits of the
search. 132
The opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez easily lends itself to reformulation in
Morrison's terms. The arguments used by the majority to deny his claim
can without difficulty be rephrased in terms of the "focus" of the relevant
constitutional forms. The similarity to Morrison lies in the Court's analysis
of which activities were most significant for purposes of the relevant
constitutional provision. Since the defendant alleged a Fourth Amendment
violation, the "focus" of the constitutional provision was in Mexico and the
application of the U.S. Constitution would be extraterritorial. As a result,
the presumption against extraterritoriality would apply, imposing a burden
that the defendant could not meet. Because there would not be sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption, the Fourth Amendment would not apply.
The Court recognized that if the issue of admissibility had been a
matter for the Fifth Amendment, rather than the Fourth Amendment, then
the defendant's claim would have been stronger.13 3 Violation of the Fifth
Amendment infringes on the defendant's right at trial, and the trial was
taking place in the United States.13 4 Violations of the Fourth Amendment,
in contrast (said the Court) take place in the field-Mexico-in the place
where the search is performed.' 3 ' The exclusion of the illegally seized
evidence at trial, in United States, is only a judicially created remedy for a
violation that occurs elsewhere.136
Verdugo-Urquidez, decided many years prior to Morrison, made what
was essentially the same argument but only using only slightly different
terminology. The key to determining applicability was determination of the
focus of the norm in question. For the Fourth Amendment, the focus was
the illegal search.137 - For the Fifth Amendment, the focus would be the
trial.13 8 The reasoning in Morrison lends itself easily to this distinction.
From this perspective, the Morrison logic appears to be nothing more than
simple common sense.
132. See id. at 264 ("For purposes of this case, therefore, if there were a constitutional
violation, it occurred solely in Mexico. Whether evidence obtained from respondent's Mexican
residences should be excluded at trial in the United States is a remedial question separate from the
existence vel non of the constitutional violation." (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
354 (1974))).
133. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264-65 (1990).
134. Id at 264.
135. Id. at 264, 275.
136. See id. at 271.
137. Id at 274-75.
138. Id. at 264.
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2. The War on Terror and the Availability of Habeas Corpus Relief
Finally, a pair of cases concerning the availability of habeas corpus
raises the question whether Morrison should have any effect on that area of
law. Rasul v. Bush and Boumediene v. Bush were War on Terror cases
involving the rights of prisoners held at the Guantinamo Bay Naval
Base.13 9 The prisoners were aliens and not American citizens; they had
been taken into custody at various places around the world in connection
with the war on terror.14 0 The prisoners sought a procedural opportunity to
challenge their confinement and framed their complaint as an application
for habeas corpus. 141 The government's response included the claim that
habeas was not available as a remedy in such circumstances, because the
individuals in question were all incarcerated outside the United States and
were not Americans.1 4 2
The first of the two cases, Rasul, was resolved through interpretation of
28 U.S.C § 2241, the federal habeas statute.14 3 The Court construed the
statute as allowing the plaintiffs relief.'" Following the decision in Rasul,
Congress amended the federal habeas statute, thereby putting an end to the
claim that habeas relief should be available as a statutory matter.145 The
second of the two cases, Boumediene, was then filed; it dealt with the
geographical reach of the federal Constitution's Suspension Clause, which
protects the constitutional right to habeas corpus from being suspended. 146
Again, the prisoners were held entitled to the writ's protection.14 7
As in Verdugo-Urquidez, these cases did not rely on Morrison itself;
Morrison had not yet been decided. However, there are places in the
opinions where lines of argument quite similar to Morrison's can be found.
One of the Rasul majority's arguments, in particular, was actually quite
compatible with the logic of Morrison. Relying on historical accounts
dating back to the drafting of the Constitution and even earlier, the Court
concluded,
139. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732
(2008).
140. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470-71; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734.
141. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471-72; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734.
142. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739; see Rasul, 542 U.S. at 472-73.
143. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473-75, 484.
144. Id. at 481 ("Application of the habeas statute to persons detained at the [Guantanamo]
base is consistent with the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus.").
145. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, § 1005(e), Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2741,
and the Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 7(a), Pub. L. No. 109-336, 120 Stat. 2637 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)); see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723-24.
146. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
147. Id. at 771.
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[B]ecause "the writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who
seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be
unlawful custody," a district court acts "within [its] respective
jurisdiction" within the meaning of [section] 2241 as long as "the
custodian can be reached by service of process." 48
One of the dissenting opinions recognized clearly the nature of the
majority's argument, restating it in a way that emphasized its similarity to
the argument in Morrison. "[T]he status of Guantinamo Bay," the dissent
declared, "is entirely irrelevant to the issue here. The habeas statute is
(according to the court) being applied domestically, to 'petitioners
custodians', and the doctrine that statutes are presumed to have no
extraterritorial effect simply has no application."l 49
What is interesting about these two cases goes deeper than the simple
observation that both could be restated using terms familiar to the Morrison
Court. That fact would be hardly remarkable; it should not be surprising
when courts behave consistently with one another. Rather, the most
interesting thing about the two opinions is a certain sort of inconsistency.
The Morrison logic derived from a majority opinion written by Justices
Scalia and signed by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito while
the dissenting opinion that critiqued the Morrison logic in Rasul was joined
by exactly the same justices.iso The justices that wrote the Morrison
majority opinion are the ones that dissented in Rasul and Boumediene; 1s1
the positions that these four justices took in Morrison were diametrically
opposite to the positions that they took in Rasul. If "extraterritoriality" and
the presumption against it are unitary logical constructs, it is difficult to say
why a line of reasoning that persuaded Justices Scalia, Roberts, Thomas and
Alito in the context of securities law should leave the same justices so
thoroughly unconvinced in the context of a federal habeas statute.
148. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79 (quoting Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495
(1973)); see also id. at 483-84 ("[N]o party questions the District Court's jurisdiction over
petitioners' custodians. . . . Section 2241, by its terms, requires nothing more." (internal citation
omitted)).
149. Id. at 500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (second emphasis added).
150. The majority in Morrison constituted of Justices Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas and
Alito. Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 1874 (2010). Four out of these five
had dissented in the earlier cases. Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito dissented in both
Boumediene and Rasul, while Justice Roberts (who was not on the Court for Rasul) dissented in
Boumediene. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 730; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 468.
151. See discussion supra note 97; see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 849-50 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Today the Court warps our Constitution in a way that goes beyond the narrow issue
of the reach of the Suspension Clause, invoking judicially brainstormed separation-of-powers
principles to establish a manipulable 'functional' test for the extraterritorial reach of habeas corpus
(and no doubt, for the extraterritorial reach of other constitutional pro3tections as well).").
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The most likely explanation for difference in treatment seems to be as
follows. The Morrison logic has the overall effect of extending the reach of
the norm that is being interpreted. It does this by singling out one
occurrence-the "focus" of the norm-and treating the entire problem as
domestic whenever that one occurrence takes place within the
jurisdiction. 152 In the context of federal securities law, this strategy has the
consequence of adding to the reach of federal law. Since the presumption
against extraterritoriality otherwise makes it nearly impossible to establish
applicability of the securities law (the standard of proof being so exacting)
treating some cases as purely domestic-even when they have connections
to more than one state-ensures that at least these transactions will be
regulated.
In the context of federal habeas, either constitutional or statutory, the
consequences of Morrison also extend the geographical reach of the norm.
However, because the norm is a limitation on federal power-it protects the
rights of prisoners against the custodian-the end result of increasing the
reach of the norm is that federal power is actually more limited than it
would otherwise be. The consequence, ironically, is that if Morrison's
reasoning is applied generally-for instance, in all cases where there is an
issue of extraterritoriality of state regulatory authority or of the reach of
constitutional or statutory provisions-it may in some situations have
exactly the opposite result of what the Morrison majority would have
anticipated.
3. CONCLUSION
At this point, some tentative hypotheses about Morrison's underlying
logic and its consequences can be formulated:
* Morrison's second step, requiring the identification of "domestic"
cases and "focus" of the statute, is a reaction to the decision's
overly restrictive first step, placing an unrealistic burden of proof
on the party seeking to rebut the presumption;
* The Morrison logic about domestic cases is judge-made, as is the
restrictive burden of proof that Morrison imposes. The doctrine of
152. This is a familiar strategy from the conflict of laws, where different theoretical
approaches all tend to select a single factor and rely on it to the exclusion of every other factor.
This phenomenon, and the problems that it creates, is analyzed in Lea Brilmayer & Raechel
Anglin, Choice of Law and the Metaphysics of the Stand-Alone Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1125,
1127 (2010) (criticizing "the common assumption that judges can determine the correct choice of
law by identifying one particular, theoretically exceptional contact that, even when standing alone,
dominates the choice of law process and dictates the result").
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legislative supremacy does not support it;
* The second step of the Morrison argument in most circumstances
has the consequence of extending the reach of the norm to which it
is applied;
* There are situations where this logic coincides with common sense
and precedent, and the Morrison opinion performs an important
service by unifying these applications;
* It is important, however, to apply this logic consistently and to vary
its application only when there is a principled basis for different
treatment and not as a result of political attitudes towards outcomes.
There may be a principled way to differentiate the contexts, and to
apply the Morrison line of reasoning in one context but not the other-
some reasoning, that is, other than the simple political position that state
power should be enhanced at all costs. However, until there is adequate
practical and intellectual attention to all of the ramifications of the
definition of extraterritoriality, the "new extraterritoriality" is bound to
bring us problems and surprises.
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